News interviews

Egypt Independent speaks to Jama’a al-Islamiya about its role in today’s society

Ali Abdel Mohsen — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 20:53:00 +0000

The most noticeable thing about Assiut city’s Abu Bakr al-Sideeq Mosque isn’t the building itself, which stands almost camouflaged among several identically painted apartment blocks, but the signs surrounding it. Along its iron-bar fence and plastered on its walls, printed and handwritten posters advertise the availability of medication, meals and religious lessons — all free and all provided by Jama’a al-Islamiya, the hardline Islamist group that has adopted the mosque as its headquarters.

Across the street hangs a plaza-wide banner of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the group’s leader — currently imprisoned in the US — and, directly beneath it, a Jama’a-sponsored “meat market” consisting of an empty stall and an abandoned chopping block.

Despite claims of having reformed its violent ways, the group’s politics are still considered problematic by many Egyptians, particularly in the wake of the declared intention to form law-enforcing “popular committees” as a solution to the nation’s increasing security problem. Egypt Independent sat down with Shaaban Ali Ibrahim, president of the group’s public committee, to discuss the issue.

Egypt Independent: How does Jama’a al-Islamiya fit into Assiut society? What role does it play here, and what role should it play on a national level?

Shaaban Ali Ibrahim: Since its inception, the Jama’a has played a crucial role in the public aspects of life in Assiut, and has been active on a social, political and proselytical level. Today, the Construction and Development Party serves as our political arm, but the Jama’a itself has been the main Islamic current in Assiut since 1970.

It has gone through a period of collision with the regime, and consequently, our members were imprisoned for more than 20 years — during which they were subjected to the harshest of conditions and the most brutal of torture methods. But our members are strong, and they emerged from these ordeals as men, more eager than ever to preach and work for the religion of God.

We discovered, upon our release, a changed community, but one we have successfully adapted to. Today, we have resumed our activities in Assiut, and all major cities.

We have our mosques, where we practice the dawah [call] in the name of God, an act we were previously denied. Before the uprising, the regime had prohibited us from proselytizing. We were not allowed to have mosques, and our members were banned from even serving as imams for public prayer services. Now, we are more able to carry out our activities on the ground, in public, to benefit the public.

EI: What sort of activities?

Ibrahim: We distribute bread and butane gas canisters to those who can’t afford them. We hold reduced-price markets, both permanent ones like the meat and produce markets, and also seasonal ones, at the start of the school year — for example, selling textbooks and stationary.

The Jama’a also organizes clothing drives where items are donated, washed and redistributed to the poor, as well as charities to benefit orphans and widows and those living in poverty. We have caravans that offer medical services, specifically for those who live out in rural areas.

We have also been providing security in the form of our popular committees, or at least up until recently, when the media started making a big deal about that.

EI: By popular committees, do you mean a police force?

Ibrahim: Our popular committees have always been about more than what the media is so focused on these days. When we say our popular committees carry out the work of security forces, we use the term “security” in a much broader sense than most people seem to realize.

This has been our belief, and practice, since the revolution: that our popular committees perform all varieties of services that benefit the nation and worshippers, including making them feel secure. We don’t aim to replace the police, we just substitute for them when they choose to withdraw or go on strike or remain unresponsive — and why is this a problem?

Our popular committees also stand in for sanitary workers when they go on strike. Nobody complains about that.

EI: There have been constant tensions, just as there were with the previous regime, between the Islamist parties and the media. What is the root of this problem?

Ibrahim: All media are politicized. This is obvious to anyone with eyes and a working brain.

Look at Upper Egypt, for example, and how it’s presented. Upper Egypt is kept out of the media, just as it is kept out of social and political life. Where is the fair media that identify a problem before it occurs, before lives are lost over it?

EI: Are you upset over a lack of coverage, or over ineffective policy?

Ibrahim: Media is media and it must be changed. Unfortunately, doing so will be difficult, as you are talking about re-educating those who work in media, and reintroducing concepts such as loyalty and patriotism.

These two concepts are sorely lacking. Today, a thug ambushes a civilian car and the media calls him a “patriot.” And if the thug gets killed by the police for what he’s doing, he’s called a martyr.

EI: Maybe he doesn’t need to be killed. Maybe he can just be dealt with in a less extreme manner.

Ibrahim: The police need to be more involved. They have no will, no fangs, and this will not do.

They need to be empowered again. Can you imagine anyone standing up to the police in [former President Hosni] Mubarak’s time the way they do now?

EI: That’s partially how the revolution started. Just earlier, you were complaining about the brutality of the force, which you now sound nostalgic for. Would you condone it if it were carried out on those who, to you, deserve punishment?

Ibrahim: I complained about brutality and ferocity, which, prior to the revolution, we had experienced at the hands of the regime, more so than anyone else. What we are calling for now is a police force that is effective in putting down the threats facing this country.

EI: Are your popular committees heavily armed?

Ibrahim: No. We are not armed, we do not have weapons, and our popular committees do not carry any weapons. This is a statement that has even been made on several occasions by the chief of security in Assiut.

EI: So how do you expect to enforce anything?

Ibrahim: We have a certain influence here. People respect us, they turn to us and they value what we say. This is a bond that has been established through our practices and teachings. Here, our word has weight.

EI: Even in the face of violent crime?

Ibrahim: Yes, for a very important reason: We are respected here. It would be impossible for anyone to attack a member of Jama’a al-Islamiya because we are loved and looked up to. We are also known as members of society. A thug wouldn’t think to attack me because, at the end of the day, I either know him or his family or his friend.

It’s the same with protests. If a protest breaks out here, police will respond violently, whereas we can disperse it simply by talking to people and convincing them to go home. We solve problems the police can’t.

EI: Such as?

Ibrahim: We can address social issues in a way the police cannot, and there’s nothing wrong with that. Just like how the Prophet served as a counsel for his people, we provide the same service.

You might not understand because it’s different in Assiut than it is in Cairo. But say a family has a dispute over inheritance, or a husband and wife are having intimate problems — you can’t take those problems to the police. To the average Assiut mentality, that would be a scandal.

EI: How do your popular committees serve the reformation of the police?

Ibrahim: Societies differ as do their sensibilities. There must be re-education on both sides before you can reconcile the police with the people. It’s a slow process, but otherwise, how will the people learn? We shall teach them. We shall approach them and explain the situation and what needs to be done.

I question whether the police can be re-educated. Whoever chooses to join a force like that, their brain works differently. You can be sure they have the desire to feel superior to the average citizen, to feel more worthy.

We need our police to dignify their position, not use it against others, and this is also something we preach. But as I told you before, we are not attempting to replace anything. Our efforts are limited to advice and preaching. To execute change is the job of the ruler.

EI: What would you say about the ruler’s attempts to change?

Ibrahim: Islam guarantees all rights — even those of animals, not just humans. The term “human rights” is a modern trend, a new phrase for what Islam has been preaching for thousands of years.

Don’t be fooled into thinking there’s anything modern or foreign about this notion of human rights. All rights, even those of other religions, exist in Islam — they are the basis of it.

EI: Speaking of human rights, those medical caravans you mentioned, is female genital mutilation among the services they offer?

Ibrahim: Not yet, no. The caravans are not currently equipped for surgical procedures, but we are continuously updating them, with the help of God. I know what you are getting at, that some people oppose this practice and call it a human rights violation. I would advise them to turn to the fatwas of Sheikh Gad al-Haq on the matter.

On the legacy of the Iraq War: Q&A with Rashid Khalidi

Yassin Gaber — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 11:38:00 +0000

In commemoration of the 10-year anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq, Egypt Independent spoke to American historian Rashid Khalidi on the effects of the war on Iraqi and regional politics, American foreign policy and the prospects of democratic change in a currently destabilized and fractured Iraq.

Egypt Independent: I would like to begin by hearing your impressions on how the 2003 US invasion of Iraq has impacted Washington’s foreign policy, noting that it is widely considered a failed undertaking. Furthermore, how has it affected Iraq internally?

Rashid Khalidi: The invasion led to the dismantling of the Iraqi state, and this is not just a structure that was manipulated by the Ba’ath Party dictatorship. The court system, archives, aspects of the rule of law, routinization: All of those things were swept away. Everything was destroyed.

The army and the security services were fired, we know this, but basically the entire government bureaucracy was released, and so everything that had been done since the middle of the 19th century, since Midhat Basha was the wali [governor] of Baghdad — I mean literally the 1850s — was swept away as if by a tsunami. And there were other debilitating social and economic effects: Maybe one in five or six Iraqis became internal or external refugees.

So there were these material effects on Iraq — tens of thousands, maybe scores of thousands of people killed; the infrastructure of the economy and society were badly damaged. And then there were the sectarian and long lasting political effects: When the United States imposed the sectarian model on Iraq, which I think, in large measure, was copied from Lebanon.

That was not a very good idea. That model produced three civil wars in Lebanon from the 1860s up until 1990, when the last war ended.

By introducing political sectarianism in the Iraqi system, the United States responded to the legitimate complaints of the Shia and the Kurdish sectors of the Iraqi people by dealing with the poison with poison. The antidote to sectarianism wasn’t the institutionalization of sectarianism, and that is what was the United States did with what Iraqis call Bremer’s constitution.

On the other side of the ledger, the Iraqis have got rid of Saddam Hussein, which is a good thing, but of the anniversary pieces I have seen, a lot of them are not saying, “Oh happy days, we are so pleased that Saddam is gone.” Even the ones who hated him are not terribly happy with the status quo.

As far as the impact on the United States, along with the Afghan war ... it reanimated the so-called Vietnam syndrome, which is a reluctance of the American public opinion to go along with their leaders in overseas military adventures. That’s one reason the Obama administration came to office in 2008, a reaction to Bush.

And that’s one reason this administration has been so reluctant to carry out overt military intervention, anywhere — Libya, Syria, the most recent example. That also means that the United States is using indirect means like drone strikes and other covert means to achieve its end rather than direct military intervention.

EI: How urgent is the sectarian question within the regional context? Was it purely a tool in Iraq? How relevant are Sunni-Shia divisions within a broader regional context, with Iraq situated between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the seeming existence of a cold war between these Sunni and Shia bastions?

Khalidi: The United States entered into this whole affair at a time when it was engaged in an American-Iranian cold war, which is ongoing. But there’s also a very intense rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and a very intense rivalry between Iran and Israel.

[Saudi Arabia and Israel] are the two closest American allies in the Middle East, and so one of the things that has in fact happened here is that the Iraq war, which was intended to create a pro-American bastion to help in the struggle against Iran, has done quite the opposite. With the weakening of the Syrian regime, the closest, most reliable ally that Tehran has is the [Nouri al-]Maliki government in Baghdad. This is not an intentional outcome of the invasion, but it is a direct result.

In order to unseat the Ba’athist regime, the United States helped to cultivate sectarian tensions and put together the coalition of Kurds and Shia against Sunnis in Iraq, thereby exacerbating existing sectarian problems, and, sooner or later, causing a problem for themselves because they had a Sunni resistance on their hands. The point here is that, obviously, sectarianism existed before the Iraq War — in Iraq and in the region — but it’s been used ... as a tool by the United States, by Saudi Arabia, by Israel, each in its own way to distract attention from all kinds of other things.

The invasion, by destroying the Iraqi state, by creating this unstable, internal sectarian conflict, turned Iraq into a battleground, which is now replicated in Syria between regional powers, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

EI: What are the implications of Syria’s civil war on Iraq’s unstable political fabric — the cost of insurgents moving freely between Syria and Lebanon, and even Syria and Iraq?

Khalidi: Syria represents the third Arab country which has been subjected to this kind of dismantling of state structure, through civil war and the devastation of a large part of society and the economy. Lebanon was the first case of a civil war, which was also a proxy war between all regional powers, [notably] Syria, Israel and the Palestinians. After the 2003 American invasion, Iraq has been devastated.

We are now witnessing a third successive instance of an Arab country being subjected to civil war with different parties in that war being supported from the outside. So I think it has the potential ... for reigniting the civil wars in these two adjacent countries.

The fact that you have cross-border sympathies of populations, which in fact are only artificially divided by these borders, means that you now have people move. Fighters move from Iraq to Syria or from Lebanon to Syria just as before people moved from Syria to Lebanon and from Syria to Iraq.

EI: Discussions on Iraq are always couched in sectarian terms. How much of this is really reflected on the ground? Is this more emblematic of politicians and the media drowning out the street?

Khalidi: That’s a very good question. Actually, I was just reading a news story which said that in Iraqi universities, astonishingly, you don’t get this sectarianism amongst Sunni and Shia students. Yet the politicians, on their soap boxes, are playing it for all it’s worth.

And I know from my older Iraqi friends that sectarianism played very little role in Iraq — yes, the Sunni dominated; yes, the monarchy was Sunni, yes, yes, yes — but you know, people inter-married. There were Kurds and Arabs who intermarried, there were Sunni and Shia.

It would appear for young people it doesn’t have quite the valance as some of the older folks involved in politics and for whom sectarianism has proved to be a path to political power, given the system established by the United States after the occupation.

EI: Have the Arab uprisings had a significant effect on Iraq? Could recent street mobilizations there bring about regime change?

Khalidi: Well, I don’t know about that. There is a huge security service that has been installed by the Americans and the Iraqis, [and] a very large army. I wonder how easy it would be for an uprising to take place.

In addition, when you have a population that’s divided on a sectarian basis ... it’s very hard to organize among those sectarian lines.

I would argue Iraq is a little bit like Palestine, which is not divided on a sectarian basis but which has this problem of, do you rise up against the occupation or against the Palestinian authority, which many people see as the handmaiden behind the occupation. Do you deal with the problems of internal governments, the problems of Hamas and Fattah and their ineptitude and their lack of strategy, their selfishness and corruption, or do you deal with the Israeli occupation, which is the framework for all of this?

I think the Iraqis have a bit of the same problem: They have the sectarian issue and they have the problem of, where is the real target? Is it the people who created this mess, the Americans? Or Iran, which dominates the regime? Is the problem the regime? And how does one organize across those sectarian lines?

It’s hard to cross those sectarian barriers to have a people’s uprising in Iraq, even though clearly there is sentiment that is similarly dissatisfied with the government and with the extraordinary corruption, with the inability of the Iraqi government to provide electricity for its citizens. This country exports ... energy to the entire world, but they can’t provide energy for the people for more than a few hours a day? It’s obscene.

The Americans spent billions of dollars on so-called reconstruction, but they don’t have electricity? It’s quite astonishing, the levels of corruption. There’s a lot to protest in Iraq, and yet I’m not sure it’s possible across these hardened sectarian lines.

The head of the Farmers Syndicate talks about their continuing battle

Ahmed Abdel Hafez — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 13:13:00 +0000

As farmers took to the streets as part of the mobilization against the draft constitution, Mohamed Abdel Qader, chief of the Farmers Syndicate established in April 2011, announced that he was joining the oppositional National Salvation Front.

Farmers are stereotyped as revolt-averse; however, political developments over the past two years have put their political engagement on display.

Expressing their rejection of the Constitution while it was still in its draft phase, farmers were seen joining protests and raising banners at a time when several groups and sectors of society started expressing their objection to what was later approved as the nation’s new Constitution.

Egypt Independent had a conversation with Abdel Qader about how the Constitution falls short in recognizing the rights of farmers, half of the nation’s population.

Egypt Independent:Why do you oppose the Constitution if it allocates the same 50 percent quota to farmers and workers, which represents the biggest victory for farmers since the 1952 revolution?

Mohamed Abdel Qader:This article is tricky. It was added at the last minute, while members of the Constituent Assembly were voting on the final constitutional draft. Furthermore, it was added to the transitional articles chapter, which means that the 50 percent quota only applies to the coming Parliament, and will then be abrogated.

EI:How is this article tricky?

Abdel Qader:It is a trick in the sense that the majority of Constituent Assembly members did not approve it, and that it was [drafted] only at the last minute to serve certain political calculations. They feared that if that article was taken out, the Constitution would lose the support of labor and farmers when put to a nationwide referendum.

They incorporated it as a transitional article to mobilize farmers and workers’ support, comfortable in the knowledge that it would automatically expire. The new Constitution limits Shura Council membership to holders of university degrees, which means that illiterate people and holders of intermediate and lower degrees, including farmers, are excluded.

EI:Is this political maneuver the reason why you walked out of the Constituent Assembly?

Abdel Qader:I did not withdraw from it, I only froze my membership there for five days to protest the disregard of 16 demands related to farmers, which it was important to guarantee in the Constitution and which were ignored by everyone. Not a single political power or Constituent Assembly member has contacted me since I suspended my membership.

EI:What were those 16 demands?

Abdel Qader:We wanted the Constitution to stipulate that farmers and their families had the right to direct health insurance without prior subscription, as is the case with government employees. Farmers are the only people who support the state for no return.

We wanted the Constitution to stipulate that the state should support farmers in the production of crops by supplying services, supporting their agricultural production, making required agricultural equipment available, and helping farmers promote their produce. Our most important demand was for the state to supply desert land to farmers, their children and holders of agricultural degrees, because this is their right to Egyptian land.

Nobody would be more keen on growing on Egyptian land that its own farmers.

EI:Were you the only representative of farmers on the Constituent Assembly?

Abdel Qader:Yes, I was the only representative of farmers on the assembly because I am the president of the first Farmers Syndicate in Egypt. This syndicate has 1.6 million members, even though it has been in existence for less than two years.

It is the chief representative of farmers. Farmers represent at least 40 percent of the population, because official estimates put the number of people who live in rural areas at 56 percent of the total population.

EI:How were the articles concerning farmers negotiated with you?

Abdel Qader:I negotiated directly with Hossam al-Gheriany, the head of the Constituent Assembly, to define “farmers” as “everyone who has no source of livelihood but agriculture.” I wanted farmers to get direct health insurance and to be given arid land to grow, but he emphatically rejected my demands.

EI:Did you mobilize members of the syndicate to vote against the new Constitution?

Abdel Qader:We did not mobilize either members of the syndicate or farmers in general to cast a “yes” or “no” vote, because we are not a political party and we cannot act as politicians. After I froze my membership of the Constituent Assembly, I met with members of the syndicate board and syndicate branches heads in the 27 governorates, and they were supportive of the decision.

EI:Why did the syndicate not mobilize the farmers to reject the Constitution if the draft did not safeguard their rights?

Abdel Qader:The syndicate is not a guardian, and I repeat, we are not a political party, and farmers constitute a large bloc that permeates several sectors of the state. The majority of Egyptian army officers are the sons of farmers, be they volunteers, army conscripts or Central Security Forces conscripts.

All of those who die in illegal immigration accidents are sons of farmers — they all come from villages, and none of them are sons of employees or urban dwellers. This is another chance for me to emphasize that my decision to freeze my membership in the Constituent Assembly was not politically motivated. It only came in objection to the disregard of the legitimate rights of farmers in the draft constitution.

EI:Why did you join the National Salvation Front if you see the syndicate as a nonpolitical body and if the freezing of your Constituent Assembly membership was a nonpolitical decision?

Abdel Qader:I joined the front to draw the attention of the president to the fact that this Constitution has ignored broad sectors of society. My decision to protest in Tahrir was a personal position that does not reflect the syndicate’s official position.

There were about 7,000 farmers in Tahrir [some weeks ago], all of whom acted on their own initiative. We want to express solidarity with the judges in their demand for independence and with journalists in their demand for the cancellation of imprisonment in publishing cases.

EI:What happens now?

Abdel Qader: The battle for farmer rights is not over. We will use the transitional 50 percent quota article to have candidates in the coming Parliament and will ally with certain figures to form a parliamentary bloc of farmers to present our demands for amending the Constitution to uphold farmer rights.

EI:But the new Constitution gives the government the right to dissolve syndicates if a judicial ruling is issued to that end.

Abdel Qader:This is not a problem. Farmers will continue to demand their rights until they get them. If the syndicate is dissolved after the new Constitution is endorsed, we will establish an association, civil society organization or any other organizational structure to bring together the 1.6 million members and others to defend the rights of farmers because we have no other option.

This piece was originally published in Egypt Independent's weekly print edition.

A conversation with Salafi political leader Emad Abdel Ghafour

Abdelrahman Youssef — Thu, 10 Jan 2013 13:20:00 +0000

Deputy founder of the nascent Salafi Watan Party and presidential assistant Emad Abdel Ghafour announced the establishment of the party on 1 December after resigning from the presidency of the Nour Party, the political arm of the Salafi Dawah.

He also announced the formation of the Free Homeland Alliance, an electoral coalition to be led by former presidential hopeful Hazem Salah Abu Ismail for the upcoming House of Representatives elections.

Egypt Independent met with Abdel Ghafour to speak about Islamist politics and its position and potentials in Egypt.

Egypt Independent: Why are you founding the Watan Party now?

Emad Abdel Ghafour: Because even though there are so many parties in Egypt, they have lost touch with the Egyptian street and the ordinary citizen. There is a political void that needs to be filled, and we founded the Watan Party to present a more coherent alternative that feels the pulse of the Egyptian street and better expresses its hopes and needs.

EI: But some say that the Egyptian people are becoming less interested in politics, and that the addition of yet another party to the map of existing political parties will be of no significance.

Abdel Ghafour: This is not true. The Egyptian people cannot find trustworthy representatives to place their confidence in.

EI: What is the difference between the Watan and Nour parties?

Abdel Ghafour: The difference is clear. When we formed the Nour Party, our goal was to set up a party that reflects the hopes of Egyptians, and we achieved successes with the Nour Party, much to the surprise of both Egyptian and international public opinion. But due to factors out of our control, we became isolated.

I thought that the solution was to have another entity that can satisfy those conditions and live up to those criteria.

EI: Is your vision of Islamic Sharia identical to that of other Islamist parties, such as the Nour, Freedom and Justice and Construction and Development parties?

Abdel Ghafour: We believe that instead of talking about Islamic Sharia, we should put it into practice. The same applies to social justice and dignity. We want them to be a living reality.

We believe that Islamic Sharia is about justice, mercy and wisdom. If we put these values into practice and seek benefit for the people, then we will be applying Sharia. We will take any road that we believe leads to the implementation of Sharia and takes the people out of the darkness to the light.

EI: There is confusion regarding the role of Abu Ismail in the new party.

Abdel Ghafour: To be sure, Abu Ismail represents a considerable scientific and social value in Egyptian society. He has appeal among hundreds of thousands of Egyptians.

When we founded the party, we were keen to win the support of several leaders of social and political activism, of whom Abu Ismail is one. At the beginning, we suggested that we have some sort of cooperation with him.

He decided to be the chief supporter of the party without joining it. He will tour governorates and do publicity without being an official leader.

EI: Some believe that you are different from Abu Ismail, who has the support of so-called revolutionary Salafis. How did those two seemingly disparate ways of thinking meet?

Abdel Ghafour: We thought that this alliance or understanding would be beneficial for all parties. We have gained the support of one of the leaders of public opinion and this will enrich the party.

At the same time, the membership of several experts in the party will moderate Abu Ismail’s views if the opinions he expresses have not been carefully studied or are insufficiently developed. The presence of all of these experts will help with the adoption of moderate views in the future.

Abu Ismail’s alliance with us will oblige him to stick to mechanisms of political work, which does not involve violence or threats to use violence. The alliance will strike a balance between the dynamism and mobility of Abu Ismail’s supporters and a more sensible political vision.

Additionally, the party’s decisions are nonbinding for Abu Ismail, and vice versa. Cooperation between us will have a positive impact on Abu Ismail, since it will make his views more realistic and moderate.

EI: What is the party’s frame of reference? Are there going to be jurisprudential references, certain scholars, with whom you work, since the party has an Islamic approach?

Abdel Ghafour: There will be no external guardianship, intellectual or otherwise, but there will be political mechanisms and political leaderships. There will also be a religious committee inside the party concerned with its Islamist dimension.

The party will conform to the opinions of prestigious scientific academies, such as the Islamic Research Academy.

EI: It is said that the foundation of the Watan Party before the elections will divide Islamists and splinter votes, what do you think?

Abdel Ghafour: On the contrary, in fact, the Egyptian street seems to be losing trust in political work, particularly in parties that have an Islamist frame of reference. Corrective movements that emerge from inside Islamist circles could restore confidence to some degree.

EI: Why weren’t members from the Muslim Brotherhood, liberal and leftist powers present at the party conference? And does that mean that they will not be part of the coming electoral alliance?

Abdel Ghafour: First of all, we have invited the FJP, but it seems they are busy. Still, our relationship with them is very strong.

As for the other currents, the speed with which we organized the party may have not enabled us to invite them. Members of the liberal and leftist current that we invited either declined the invitation or said they would come but failed to show up.

Concerning an alliance with the Brotherhood, let us be realistic, the Brotherhood and its party see themselves as our “big brother,” and so if there was an invitation, it is they who should extend it. If a nascent party sends an invitation to others, it is quite natural that it only gets a limited response.

EI: Has it already been determined which political powers will ally with the Watan Party? And what percentage of seats does the Free Homeland Alliance wish to contest in the elections?

Abdel Ghafour: There are several parties that are rich from an intellectual and scientific perspective but which do not have a wide base of support or sufficient financial resources.

These parties can join us and we will together create a mix that wins the support of the people.

Regarding the percentage of seats we want to contest, we have the ability to run for 100 percent of the seats. But coordination with other political powers is what will determine this issue.

EI: Is there a possibility of you allying with non-Islamist parties?

Abdel Ghafour:We can meet with any party that has a national agenda or frame of reference. We hope the alliance will encompass the biggest number of patriotic political powers that only work to serve the society.

EI: Abu Ismail talked about a clear legislative agenda, so are members of the alliance going to have a binding political agenda inside Parliament?

Abdel Ghafour:We have to make a distinction between an electoral and a political alliance. It is not necessary to have an alliance inside Parliament just because there was an alliance in the elections.

But there aren’t any major ideological or intellectual differences between parties that have an Islamist reference, and so it is easy for them to agree on a certain legislative agenda. The Watan Party has a legislative committee and a parliamentary bloc, which are examining the party’s agenda with Abu Ismail, who is a specialist in legal affairs.

The goal is to produce an end product to use in the legislative session. We have an independent agenda, you can say, but that will not stop us from reaching agreements with others.

EI: How are you going to handle financing as a nascent party with elections around the corner?

Abdel Ghafour: There are businessmen and university professors who spoke to me and expressed a desire to support the party. I sat with some of them, too.

This is not the first time we face these challenges. With the Nour Party, we had several successes with relatively few resources. We are now going through the same process, which may be slightly harder this time. However, this time our determination is stronger, experience broader and steps bigger.

EI: What are the priorities for the party in the coming parliamentary session?

Abdel Ghafour:The issue of justice is the most important issue and requires reforming the Interior and Justice ministries, for they are of core importance. We will work to reform the body of legislation that governs their work because the people long for justice and security. Then we will focus on reforming the economic system.

EI: Are you going to be able to strike a balance between your presidency of the party and your position as presidential aide?

Abdel Ghafour:We do not have a hegemonizing president, but rather bodies that work on different dossiers and a “coordinating president.” The philosophy on the basis of which the party was established calls for the division of power centers.

This piece was originally published in Egypt Independent's weekly print edition.

Rights group: If complaints not addressed, referendum voting should be repeated

Al-Masry Al-Youm — Mon, 17 Dec 2012 17:47:00 +0000

Local rights groups may appeal to the international community to apply pressure on the Morsy administration to repeat the first round of voting in the constitutional referendum, said Hafez Abu Seada on Monday.

Abu Seada, who is the head of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights and the general coordinator of the Egyptian Alliance to Monitor the Referendum, added that observers from the alliance noted thousands of violations during the first voting round across 10 governorates.

Preliminary indications showed that 57 percent voted for the controversial draft constitution, while 43 percent voted against it.

The second round of voting is scheduled for 22 December in the remaining 17 governorates.

Abu Seada also said the High Elections Committee has not responded to the hundreds of complaints submitted by the alliance.

“The committee found the irregularities normal,” he said. “It did not bother to investigate the complaints.”

Committee President Zaghloul al-Balshy, however, said he did not receive these complaints.

Abu Seada added that members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party were seen inside polling stations influencing voters. “They prevented citizens from casting their votes in some Upper Egypt governorates, especially in Christian villages,” he said. “Also, some claimed [falsely] they were judges and took the liberty to supervise the polling stations.”

Khairat al-Shater, the deputy supreme guide of the Brotherhood, cast his vote although there is a court ruling depriving him of exercising his political rights, Abu Seada alleged.

Edited translation from Al-Masry Al-Youm

Morsy adviser claims liberals want Mubarak-style democracy

Tom Dinham — Thu, 06 Dec 2012 12:46:00 +0000

Basem al-Zarqa, a prominent Salafi preacher and one of President Mohamed Morsy’s circle of advisers, was asking me to pray in preparation for judgment day.

“You are Christian and I am Muslim, we believe in a day of judgment,” says Zarqa.

“On this day, the one who is correct will enter paradise, and the one who is incorrect will go to hell. I just ask you to pray to God and request of him that the one who is incorrect convert to the religion of the one who is correct.”

It was an unconventional though perhaps appropriate end to an interview that had focused on Salafi attitudes toward the draft constitution and liberal opposition, after two weeks of Islamist political forces scrambling to secure the charter's ratification by popular referendum on 15 December.

Zarqa is a member of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the contentious constitution and is one of Morsy’s advisers, some of whom have resigned in the wake of the president’s controversial 22 November constitutional declaration.

He offered a rare insight into the thinking of the religious hardliners influencing Morsy’s actions from the Muslim Brotherhood’s right wing.

Four of Morsy’s advisers resigned Wednesday evening, as a political standoff escalated into fatal clashes outside the presidential palace between supporters of the president and his opponents, resulting in at least five deaths and hundreds of injuries.

More than 20 members of the Constituent Assembly the constitution had previously resigned to express discontent over Islamist influence.

Zarqa, like others in Morsy’s administration, had no patience for the opposition figures who walked out in protest.

“If you object to something you have to support [this stance] with evidence. The liberals have nothing to say in this regard,” he says. “After months of painstaking negotiation, we arrived at a broad agreement on everything except those articles related to Islam and Islamic Sharia.”

The opposing sides had come so close, in Zarqa’s telling, that even Amr Moussa, the former Arab League chief who ran against Morsy in the presidential election, had sent the administration comments on the penultimate draft.

Zarqa found the liberals’ “last minute” withdrawal unusual. His view, shared by many in the Brotherhood, is that they negotiated in bad faith from the start.

In fact, Zarqa claims, some liberal members had prior knowledge of a plot to abort the Constituent Assembly in collaboration with corrupt state institutions.

He pauses, perhaps weighing his accusation, one that has been floated publicly by Morsy and other party officials.

“I don’t like to talk about the judiciary or the constitutional court. I am not saying this is my view, but some believe this was planned from the start.”

Zarqa believes liberals cannot overcome their basic flaw: that Egyptians don’t like or support them.

“When we entered the parliamentary elections, the true size of the political powers in Egypt was revealed; the Islamic tendency is a clear majority in the street and the liberals aren’t popular,” he says.

A lack of electoral success forced the liberals into undemocratic measures, allying with former members of the Mubarak regime to regain lost ground, he argues. Those maneuvers have included applying pressure from friendly media outlets, which Islamists perceive as biased against their cause.

“There are groups within the media hostile toward either the revolution or to Islamism generally, and some of them are from the previous regime. …I won’t mention any names because of my position but the Egyptian street knows who I’m talking about,” he adds.

The liberal position has become more antagonistic, according to Zarqa, since a simple media strategy cannot succeed in changing what he described as the basically Islamic nature of Egyptian society.

Sympathetic journalists cannot overcome what Zarqa sees as the liberals’ Achilles heel: that they are not authentically Egyptian.

“The first Western person in our country was secular, so the secular person is a follower of Western civilization,” he says. This basic fact makes liberals weak, in Zarqa’s view, and explains their hostility to the country's first Islamist presidency.

To garner public support, he says, secularists are now targeting the presidency, hoping to weaken Islamists in the process.

Providing a counterpoint to opposition activists who point out that the Brotherhood often transports supporters into Cairo for demonstrations, Zarqa goes further to allege that protesters who have massed in Tahrir Square for two consecutive weeks are paid by former members of the Mubarak regime.

“I have names in every province of who is responsible of importing these people to the square to demonstrate. … The size of this demonstration is not real, but financed by known businessmen — so this isn’t a demonstration,” he says.

He likens liberals — “secularists” in his words — to Arabs in the pre-Islamic era.

“When an Arab was in the desert, he would make an idol from dates to worship, and would worship it as a God, but when he got hungry, he would eat his God. The secularists are exactly the same, they sanctify democracy until they get hungry, and then they eat it.”

To Zarqa and those in the administration who share his views, Islamists are the true democrats, and their majority at the ballot box will decide the future shape of governance.

“Is it possible to abolish the result of a democratic process in democratic philosophy? …The civil powers can never accept they have no popularity at the ballot box … they take away any value these elections have,” he says.

Basic unpopularity and lack of roots nationwide make liberals here, in Zarqa’s view, supportive of a flavorless democracy where voting changes nothing.

Lacking the ability to impose their views through elections, Zarqa accuses of liberals wanting “Mubarak’s democracy.”

“The secularists make themselves the deciders of an absolute right that they impose upon the Egyptian people … [but] who becomes the decider? The people.”

Zarqa believes that Egyptian liberals’ disinterest in real democracy has led them to use the rent-a-protest strategy, rely on foreign support and halt real change through the power of regressive state institutions.

The view is radically different from the opposition perspective, and it is hard to see much space for dialogue, but the inflammatory rhetoric is certain to continue.

“They know well we love our country more than them. We aren’t agents of America, and we don’t take money from anyone,” Zarqa claims.

Govt begins to implement employment quota for people with disabilities

Heba Fahmy — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 17:40:00 +0000

A long-standing law which seeks to ensure employment for Egypt’s disabled people may finally be implemented.

In 1975, a law was passed requiring public and private employers with more than 50 employees to reserve five percent of jobs for people with disabilities. But the law has never been implemented, leaving many people with disabilities marginalized and unemployed.

Finally, it seems as though the government has begun to enforce the quota this month based on orders from President Mohamed Morsy.

On Monday, Beheira Governor Mokhtar al-Hamalawy announced that there are 836 job openings for people with disabilities this month, for which candidates have 30 days to apply, according to state-run news agency MENA.

He added that a memo was distributed to all public companies and employers to implement the five percent quota when any job openings occur.

“At the Electricity Ministry where I work, they are starting to abide by the five percent job quota for disabled people, saying it’s based on Morsy’s orders,” Fatma Seif, head of human resources at the Ministry of Electricity, who suffers from infantile paralysis, tells Egypt Independent.

Abiding by the quota was one of the many promises Morsy made during his first meeting with people with disabilities on 22 October.

The assurances Morsy made also included the re-establishment of the National Council on Disability so that people with disabilities make up more than half of the council. The 28-member council includes nine ministers and 13 people with disabilities, according to the council’s Secretary General Hala Abdel Khaleq.

The decree to establish the council issued by former Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri in April stipulated that it include only four people with disabilities.

But Abdel Khaleq and other leading members of the council worked around the decree and included people with disabilities among the public figures and representatives of associations for people with disabilities.

Disabled protesters have complained that the council is dominated by government officials and associations for the disabled.

“The council should monitor these ministers and associations for the disabled and make sure they serve our best interest, not be dominated by them,” Seif says.

Osama Tayea, consultant for the National Council on Disability and one of the protesters, complained that the role of the current council is advisory.

“The current council has no real authority — it merely advises the Cabinet — but we want the council to have the power to issue decrees and implement them,” he says.

However, Morsy made no comment on this demand, according to Tayea.

“We’ll just have to wait and see what Morsy’s upcoming decree regarding people with disabilities will include,” he says.

Morsy also vowed to allocate LE1 million to fund the National Council on Disabilities, which faces difficulties performing its duties because of budget constraints.

“The council hasn’t received the increase in budget yet and we’re still looking for a headquarters,” Abdel Khaleq says.

Among the demands of people with disabilities are a reasonable monthly pension of LE 1,500, health insurance and the alleviation of taxes on cars they purchase.

“Any person with disabilities who’s married and has children gets a monthly pension of LE85…that’s not even enough to pay rent or buy food for a month,” Seif says.

One of the top demands is the construction of ramps leading to metro stations and ministry headquarters.

Most Egyptians struggle with the congested traffic, jagged streets and poor public transportation, an environment that is more difficult for people with disabilities.

The president said he’d look into these demands, without making any promises that they would be implemented.

However, Seif and Tayea hope that when a National Council on Disabilities that truly represents them and understands their needs is established, it would see that their demands are heeded.

On 10 October, dozens of Egyptians with disabilities held an open sit-in on Merghany Street in front of the presidential palace that lasted for around 12 days before meeting with President Mohamed Morsy.

On 14 October, the disabled protesters were attacked by security forces, causing the dismay and outrage of many political forces, who condemned the act. Four protesters were injured, including one whose arm was broken during the clashes, according to Seif’s testimony of how events escalated that day.

She says that security forces first cordoned off the disabled protesters and pushed them back. The demonstrators attempted to flee the cordon. Security forces then chased them and beat them with batons, trying to force them to leave the scene.

Seif denied security officials’ claims that the disabled demonstrators attempted to block the road.

“Most of us are in wheel chairs and crutches, how can we block a road like Merghany which is flooded with speeding cars?” she asks.

The perseverance of the disabled protesters and their refusal to leave the scene despite the attack landed them a meeting with the president a week later. Morsy officially apologized for the incident and vowed to start an investigation to hold those responsible accountable for their crime.

There are no reliable official figures on the number of disabled people in Egypt, but Abdel Khaleq estimates that there are around 12 million disabled people, equivalent to around 15 percent of Egypt’s population. The activists among them are still waiting for Morsy to follow through with his promises to guarantee them a “decent life.”

“We suspended our open sit-in for two months to give the president the opportunity to achieve his promises to us; if he doesn’t, we will take to the streets again,” Seif says.

Behind the Egypt-Israel October war: Q&A with Craig Daigle - Part 4

Mohammed Saied Ezzeldin — Sun, 14 Oct 2012 19:48:00 +0000

Egypt Independent interviews historian Craig Daigle about his seminal work “The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973” unpacking the myths surrounding the 1973 October Arab-Israeli war. In this final part of the interview, Daigle discusses the intricacies of implementing the ceasefire and the American and Soviet positions on the continuing conflict.

Egypt Independent: How did the Israelis take advantage of the negotiation period before declaring ceasefire?

Craig Daigle: In that turn, they had less concerns about occupying more territories, than they did to really put a final defeat on the Egyptian army. They really wanted to make sure that the third army was defeated. So they had stopped. And then fighting broke out on 23 October. The Israelis say it was the Egyptians who were trying to get out. That may be the case, but the Israelis responded aggressively and continued to violate. The Israelis violated the ceasefire.

EI: What was the Israeli response to (Henry) Kissinger’s orders to ceasefire? To what extent were the American and Israeli perspectives in this critical moment congruous?

Daigle: The Israeli military and even most of the Israeli leadership was very upset with Kissinger for negotiating a ceasefire without consulting them. There was a breakdown in communications in Moscow that would have send the Israelis updates, but they didn’t consult the Israelis. So when he got to Israel, he flew right from Moscow to Tel Aviv to meet with [former Israeli Prime Minister Golda] Meir, and he had three meetings in Israel. One meeting was a private meeting with Meir, another meeting was with the Israeli cabinet and a third meeting was with the military leaders. In all three meetings, the Israeli leadership — both civil and military — was upset because it didn’t make sense to stop where they were. There weren’t clear lines. The ceasefire called for lets say, the parties need to stop fighting, as of where the forces where at 12 pm on 22 October. But, nobody really knew where those lines where. Nobody had a map out and said: “At 12 pm this is where the forces were.” So, they looked at Kissinger and said: “this ceasefire doesn’t make sense,” it doesn’t work for us, it can leave us in a weak position. And, if you give us two more days, we can defeat the army, we can come to defensible borders." So they wanted a further delay in the ceasefire. Kissinger said: “listen, I can’t give you two days. Two days is too long. But it’s going to take me 12 hours to fly back to Washington," and he made a stop in London on the way back. “What you choose to do between now and when I get back to Washington, that’s up to you."

Basically, he knew the process. He knew that the Soviets would protest to him, and they couldn’t make that protest if he was flying in the air, so he knew that the longer he travelled, it was good for the Israelis. That's one of the reasons he went to Moscow to meet with (former Russian President) Leonid Brezhnev. He knew that by travelling to Moscow, that’s going to give the Israelis more time on the battlefield to accomplish what they want. He gives them the green light that says: “Listen, I can’t give you 48 hours, but I can probably give you 12 to 24 hours to advance your positions to a better line, and then you’re going to have to stop fighting. When the fighting continued after that 24-hour period, that’s when Kissinger got upset.

EI: So how was the ceasefire imposed?

Daigle: Finally on 24 October, Kissinger calls the Israeli ambassador and says: “Listen, you can only make Brezhnev look like a fool for so long.” Because basically Brezhnev had worked out this ceasefire and put his neck out on the line, so if the Israelis continued to violate the ceasefire it’s up to Brezhnev in many ways to uphold it. So what Kissinger is telling the Israelis is Brezhnev is going to have forces sent to this region if you don’t cut this crap out. Stop fighting because Brezhnev looks weak and you’re making him look weak. So Kissinger told this to the Israelis, who continued to advance. That’s what happened on the night of 24 October. Brezhnev sent a message, basically saying that if the Israelis don’t back off and return to the ceasefire lines of 22 October, the Soviets would send forces unilaterally. He wanted it as a joint US force, but he said if the US didn’t want to join, they were going unilaterally. And that’s when Kissinger put forces on a military alert on the night of 24 and 25 October and the crisis by the following morning subsided.

EI: We have known later that (former Egyptian President Anwar) Sadat refused (former Presidential Chief of Staff Saad) al-Shazly’s plan to liquidate the Israeli infiltration between the Second and Third armies. I wonder what made the Egyptian army abide by the ceasefire although the Israelis were breaching it and advancing in the Western bank of Suez Canal?

Daigle: That was what happened on 24 October exactly. On the night of 24 October after the Americans placed their forces on military alert, they recalled troops that were on leave. And they made it appear that the US was going to send forces. They started moving carriers and ships to the Mediterranean, so they’re making it appear that they were ready to intervene if needed. But they really did not want to send troops into the Middle East. You have to remember that in 1973 this was only nine months after the Paris-peace accords and this would be a sign of war, and Vietnam just ended, so the Americans didn’t want to get involved in another war in a far away land. So by pushing to the alert, Kissinger was saying to the Egyptians and to the Soviets “We are prepared to intervene if necessary.”

EI: Finally, as a historian, how do you estimate the conclusion of 18 days of fighting in both military and political terms?

Daigle: Obviously, the balance of power changed completely after Sadat advanced the attack following 14 October. Militarily, at the end of the war there was not one Egyptian soldier or one Syrian soldier on Israeli territory. The Israelis had moved beyond the Suez Canal, to the west side of the canal, they had moved further into Syria. So, it was a military victory for the Israelis. However, the war was also a political victory for Sadat, because his aims were not to defeat Israel militarily. His aims were to get the parties moved off their frozen positions, to get Kissinger actively involved. If you look at the documents leading up to 1973, what you see in early 1973 is that Kissinger doesn’t want to get involved. He’s fine with the status quo. And that’s what Sadat was trying to change. In (former US President Richard) Nixon’s first term he couldn’t do it. In 1973, Muhammad Hafiz Ismail, Sadat’s adviser for national security affairs, came to meet Kissinger in secret negotiations and he went back and said, “nothing is going to happen. Kissinger doesn’t want to get involved.” Kissinger was more interested in Europe and China; he said in a big speech that 1973 is going to be the year of Europe. The Middle East for him was a sideshow. So Sadat was trying to change that attitude. Two weeks after, Kissinger showed up in Egypt and they began the process of diplomacy and they moved the Middle East to the front of foreign policy agenda from 1974 to 1976. Sadat shook the myth of the Israelis as invincible. The Israelis believed that if there was another Middle East war, it was going to be 1967 all over again and Sadat showed them that the Egyptian defense and preparations had improved, and that the Israelis could not win another quick war. And, because they could not win a quick war against the Arabs, that made Israel weaker and it forced them to understand that they could not hold on to the territories. That was the other victory for the Arabs. They demonstrated that Israel holding on to the occupied territories doesn’t make Israel safer, because that’s the Israeli argument. But when you end up in a war and your people are dying, it doesn’t make you safer and so they realize that they had to negotiate.

Behind the Egypt-Israel October war: Q&A with Craig Daigle - Part 3

Mohammed Saied Ezzeldin — Sat, 13 Oct 2012 16:38:00 +0000

This is part 3 of Egypt Independent's interview with historian Craig Daigle, whose book, "The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973" presents seminal knowledge about the October war between Egypt, Syria and Israel in 1973. The book draws on recently declassified documents by the US State Department. This part tackles the involvement of the Soviet Union and the US in the war and how it fell in the larger conflict of the Cold War.

Egypt Independent: Your book deals with rich materials on the 1973 war, particularly the recently declassified documents by the State Department. What can these documents tell us about the tactics and goals of [former President Anwar] Sadat in the war?

Craig Daigle: Well one of the things, on one of the first days of the war, he sends [former Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger a telegram where he says “listen, this is not a war for territorial conquest.” So he’s addressing Kissinger throughout the war through back channel messages. Sometimes they come directly from Sadat. Sometimes they come from [former Foreign Minister] Ismael Fahmy. But he is basically telling him “Listen we are not looking to make this a territorial war; we have no interest in that.” They were really trying to get negotiations going. For instance, document number 116 in the US Department of State collection on the 1973 war is evident. It includes a message from Sadat to Kissinger through Muhammad Hafiz Ismail (Sadat’ adviser for national security affairs) on 7 October. It contains Sadat's pledge that his military objectives were limited. “We do not intend to deepen the engagements or widen the confrontation,” he stated unambiguously. Our basic objectives remain as always, the achievement of peace in the Middle East and not to achieve partial settlements.”

EI: But if Sadat just wanted to move the stalled situation before the war and avoid further territorial reoccupation in Sinai, why did he insist on advancing the attack on 12 October then?

Daigle: Well the problem is that he was coming under such pressure from [former Syrian President Hafez al-] Assad and the Soviets too, saying “why are you stopping, you had the success?” They didn’t understand why he was stopping, so he was coming under a lot of pressure. And that was probably Sadat’s mistake during the war. He didn’t stick to his plan, but decided to move forward because of pressure from the Syrians. I think he cared very little about Syrian interests. But he believed, that once the diplomatic process got moving, this was going to turn the war around. And that this was going to get not only Sinai back to Egypt, but to go on back to Syria. The Syrian front early on was going really well; they made some advances into the Golan, but once Sadat stopped, this allowed Israel to concentrate its forces on Syria and once they did that, the Syrians didn’t have a chance. So there were no questions that the Syrians and the Egyptians made some early gains in the first days of the war, but basically by 14 October, the Israelis had taken back and even advanced beyond where they were at the end of 1967. But that was a part of the fact that the Egyptians had stopped. Because once the Syrians moved past the Golan, they could move into Israeli or Egyptian territory, and they could fire from the Golan into Israeli territory. So for the Israelis fighting in the Sinai, despite the Egyptians advance, it was not Israeli territory, there was always the buffer. That’s why their concern the first days of the war was much more Syria and so that’s why the counter offense on Syria was much quicker, ended earlier.

EI: how was the coordination between the Egyptian and Syrian armies disentangled? Did Sadat give the Syrians up?

Daigle: He wasn’t involved in giving up the Syrian front other than the fact that he stopped his advance and that allowed the Israelis to hold on. But there was no collusion between him and the US with trying to split Sadat from Assad. No, not at all. Kissinger during the war was in frequent contact with the Egyptians for sure. But the documents don’t have any signs of sort of breaking from Assad. And he became less of a concern after the second war anyway.

EI: I believe that our understanding of the war remains incomplete without figuring out the Soviet role. How did the Soviet Union intervene in the war and its political balances?

Daigle: This is very important. The Soviets were angry with Sadat in the beginning. Many in the Soviet leadership didn’t think that they should come to Sadat’s defense at all because he had kicked out Soviet advisors in 1972. But there were others that felt that Egypt was still an ally. And that since Israel fought with American weapons to defeat Egypt, who was fighting with Soviet weapons, that [it] would be a significant loss for them in the Cold War. That would be a humiliating defeat, because that would tell Soviet allies that their weapons couldn’t keep up with the US. And they’d also say that Sadat was still an ally of the Soviet Union, despite the fact that he had kicked out their experts. The Soviets were worried that this would send the signal to their allies especially in the eastern bloc that they were not prepared to come to the defense of an ally. So the Soviets from the early days of the war began sending supplies to the Egyptians and the Syrians much like the US did to Israel. So there was a Soviet airlift going on, and there was an American airlift going on. [Former Russian President] Brezhnev was very angry that Sadat went to war, because he felt that the Soviets could get dragged into this and be put into a war with the US. So he didn’t want to get involved in this war and he worked with [former US President Richard] Nixon to reach a ceasefire. And the US wouldn’t agree to it, because Israel wanted to reverse the Egyptians gains. So that’s what’s odd, is that the Soviets would early on be willing to accept a ceasefire, because it would have left Egypt on the east side of the Suez canal and then the US wouldn’t agree to that.

EI: So, how did the situation develop? What made the US endorse a ceasefire?

Daigle: One of the ironic things about the war is that the US and the Soviet Union both didn’t want this war to take place, but they both sent weapons to their allies, which allowed them to fight the war and escalate the cold war. So those weapons helped fuel the war longer than it needed to go on. And once it was clear that the Israelis were surrounding the Egyptian army, and had pretty much the Egyptian army on defenses and were moving on to Egypt, to Alexandria, that Brezhnev invited Kissinger to Moscow and then Sadat the night of 21 October the sends a telegram to Brezhnev asking him to work out a ceasefire with Kissinger. So Kissinger goes to Moscow, he and Brezhnev work out the agreement fairly easily for a ceasefire. But Kissinger and this is one thing the documents say, when he goes to Israel he basically tells the Israelis, although there is a ceasefire in place you have until I get back to Washington. So when I’m flying back to Washington if your forces continue to advance, nothing’s going to happen while I’m flying back. When he got back to Washington he basically told the Israelis “cool your jets, stop”, and the Israelis didn’t stop. The State Department collections include a memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and [former Israeli Prime Minister Golda] Meir on 22 October 1973, 1:35pm when Kissinger assured Meir that the United States would understand if the Israelis felt they required some additional time for military dispositions before the ceasefire took effect. "You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I'm flying," he assured Meir. "Nothing can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow." When he met with Israel's military leaders immediately following his meeting with Meir, he again reiterated that pledge. "That's in your domestic jurisdiction," he said in response to [former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe] Dayan's complaint that he (Dayan) did not want to stop the Israeli advance.

Behind the Egypt-Israel October war: Q&A with Craig Daigle - Part 2

Mohammed Saied Ezzeldin — Fri, 12 Oct 2012 15:31:00 +0000

Egypt Independent interviews historian Craig Daigle, specialist on US-Middle East relations during the Cold War, whose book "The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973" represents a seminal analysis of the origins of the 6 October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The book is based on recently declassified documents in the possession of the US.

In the first part, the interview touched on political speculations prior to the war and the role played by different players in this regard. In this part, the interview attempts to reconstruct the military operation itself and unpack the common narrative about the "first air strike" often coined by the Mubarak regime to buy him national legitimacy.

Egypt Independent: I would like to bring into question an argument repeatedly propagated by the Mubarak regime, which is the “first air strike.” What was the role of the Egyptian air force in the war? And to what extent was the “first air strike” a major and decisive factor in the initial military victory in the first eight days of the war?

Craig Daigle: I don't believe the Egyptian air force was the "decisive factor" in the initial victory during the first eight days of the war. I believe the Egyptian success in the early stages had much more to do with catching the Israelis off guard, the successful crossing of the Suez Canal and the destruction of the Bar-Lev line (which was clearly aided by the air force), and the advent of a SAM (Surface-to-Air Missiles Defense System) that had been built around the Suez since 1970. That system gave cover to Egyptian troops who crossed the Suez. Once the Israelis recovered from the first week, having defeated the Syrians to the north, the Egyptian air force proved not match for the Israelis. So I would not say the Egyptian air force was the "decisive factor" in the early days of the war.

EI: What were the main differences between the Egyptian and Syrian fronts?

Daigle: The Israelis were much more concerned with the Syrian front, than they were with the Egyptian. There had been a number of skirmishes with the Syrians in September 1973. On 13 September, there was some Israeli air encounters with Syrian planes. In was much like the situation before in April 1967, where Israelis and Syrians were clashing over Damascus. And so they were much more concerned with the Syrian front.

In addition, because it was Yom Kippur, a lot of the troops were on leave. They were with their families on holiday, and so they weren’t fully mobilized. There was no question the Israelis where not fully mobilized. You know they had presence in Sinai, but Sinai also gave the Israelis a buffer against Israeli territory. And they knew that without the proper air defense (former President Anwar) Sadat couldn’t bring his army across Sinai without being destroyed, which was proven to be the case.

EI: How do you evaluate the Syrian front?

Daigle: The Syrian front was extremely dangerous for Israel. During the first three days of the war, the Israelis suffered major losses. The war cabinet meetings between (former Israeli Prime Minister Golda) Meir and her military advisers reflect the fact that the Syrians (and Egyptians to the south) were fighting much better than in 1967. But once Sadat stopped his advance in Sinai, it allowed Israel to concentrate on defeating the Syrians. The Syrian threat was much more dangerous for the Israelis, given the fact that the Syrians could have moved into the Northern Israel-Tiberias area if they succeeded in pushing the Israelis out of the Golan. The Israelis had a buffer in the south with Sinai.

EI: What about the battlefield in Sinai? How did the Israeli concentration on the Syrian front give Sadat a relative privilege?

Daigle: The Egyptian army could not advance across the Sinai into Israel because they didn’t have the air defense systems. So, they could advance 10 or 12 kilometers on the other side of the Suez Canal, and still be protected. And for Sadat, this is exactly what he wanted. What Sadat understood was that by advancing into Sinai to that 10 to 12 kilometers, he would achieve a symbolic victory by crossing the Suez and he would boost the morale of the Egyptian troops.

But most importantly, he would create a crisis in the Middle East and therefore break the broken diplomatic possessions of the United States and the Soviet Union. Once the Israelis and the Egyptians where fighting with each other in Sinai and there was the possibility to bring the US and the Soviet Union into the conflict, Sadat understood that that alone (could happen) just by moving across Sinai. He didn’t have to take it all, would get negotiations going again, would bring (former US Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger and perhaps the Soviets. But most importantly, Kissinger was actively involved into the diplomatic negotiations ,and he was right on that.

So that is why from 6 October until 9 October, Sadat brings his forces across Sinai and then he stops just where he and (former Egyptian Chief of Staff Saad) al-Shazly had agreed. Because he knew the limits of his military power. And for the most part, he achieved for the first three days of war what he had wanted.

EI: But what was the original strategy? How did they engineer the military coordination between the two fronts?

Daigle: To that extent, Sadat was achieving success, but the problem is that when he was planning the war with (former Syrian President Hafez al-) Assad, he obviously did not tell him that they would not advance after 12 kilometers. If you read the biography of Assad, he says that when he met with Sadat in April 1973 to discuss the war plans, the plan was for Egypt to go all the way across Sinai to Israel. And the Syrians most likely would not have joined a plan that did not include that, because they knew if Sadat stopped the Israelis could concentrate all of their forces on the Syrian front, which is exactly what happened. So, I would argue that in Sadat’s mind, he felt that was less of a problem because once the negotiations got going, that would help solve Assad’s problem too.

EI: How did this disparity and lack of coordination change the situation in the battlefield?

Daigle: Well, the problem is that the Israelis were pushing on Kissinger not to agree to a ceasefire until they had the opportunity to recover what they lost and push the Egyptians back to the other side of the canal. So while Kissinger was certainly willing to get the war ended, because he didn’t want the Soviets and the US dragged into this, the Israelis were begging him not to call for a ceasefire until they had the opportunity to reverse the Egyptian and Syrian success on the battlefield through the first three days of the war. And of course, the Israelis told Kissinger from the first day of war that they would have the war over in less than a week. The war started on Saturday and they said by Wednesday things should be over.

EI: But the battles on the ground were taking a different course from what they both expected!

Daigle: Right. As of the morning of 9 October, the Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz showed up in Kissinger’s office saying, ‘Listen, we are in trouble. We need the American supplies. We are in trouble,’ because the Israelis have lost a lot of their tanks that were rushing to the battlefield. They were going to Sinai and a lot of them broke down on the way, so they lost almost 500 tanks. And they lost a number of planes in the first days of the war, and even though they still have enough weapons in stock to fight the Egyptians and the Syrians, what they worried about was that if they used the reserve stocks, they wouldn’t have anything left.

EI: So, how was the situation inverted? How did the Israelis deal with the huge losses? In other words, I think bringing in the issue of the American airlift, if not essential, is very relevant in that context?

Daigle: We have the perception that without the American airlift, the Israelis wouldn’t have won the war. I don’t think that’s the case. The main problem for the Israelis was not that the Egyptian army would advance in Sinai, as the military capacity of the Egyptians would cease at taking over 12 kilometers in the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The real crisis though was that they were drained; their stock piles, their reserves, they would have been in a weak position to hold on to where they were. And that’s what worried them. That they would have to dig too deep into the reserves and that would weaken them, so that they told the Americans, ‘Listen, we are going to lose this war.’

EI: Actually, this point reminds me of what Shazly mentioned about the strategic goal of launching the war, which was in favor of draining the Israelis rather than achieving territorial advance. And this summons his dispute with Sadat beginning from the second phase of the war (following 12 October), as the latter wanted to move forward to take over the three passes (al-mamarrat) of the Sinai Peninsula.

Daigle: I agree with that. But Shazly was right when he said that the Israelis were not prepared enough to fight a long war. In the (Israelis) mindset, if there was going to be a war, it would be like 1967. And they felt in many ways that in 1973 they were much stronger than they were in 1967, so they felt that if there was a war it was going to be another short war. And the reason is not just the numbers, but when the Israelis mobilize for a war everything in the country stops. Because of the small size of the country, businesses and interest and the economy totally shut down. So basically their country comes to a standstill in a war, and so you can’t stay mobilized like that for more than a couple of weeks. Otherwise it freezes the entire country. But Sadat’s strategy was to hold on to their battlefield and their successes and try. And to be fair, he was hoping that the US and the Soviets would get dragged into the conflict, you know, because that would start negotiations. Again, Sadat at that point wanted the political and diplomatic process to take over.