As the world undergoes rapid political and economic transformations with escalating conflicts shaking the Middle East, the region has witnessed over a full year of genocide in Gaza – and no clear prospect for an end.
The conflict has expanded to southern Lebanon, reverberated in Yemen and Iraq, and reached Iran.
The Future of the Middle East series seeks to explore these challenges through interviewing prominent politicians, theorists, intellectuals, and current and former diplomats, providing various regional and international perspectives.
Through these discussions and insights, lessons from the past are shared in order to chart a path forward.
From the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict to regional interventions and the rise of new non-state actors, this series engages in enlightened discussions regarding what can be learned from history and how it will impact the region’s future.
It aims to explore visions for the future and highlight the vital role that Arab nations can play if historical alliances are revived, pushing towards sustainable stability while safeguarding their interests.
The structure of the series involves two parts – the first being a series of seven fixed questions based on requests from readers on the future of the region. The second part features questions tailored to the interviewees specific background, providing new insights into the overarching vision of the interview.
Ultimately, this series aims to explore how the Arab region can craft its own unified independent project – one free of external influence.
Interview:
In this exclusive interview with Al-Masry Al-Youm, American diplomat and former US Envoy to Syria, James Franklin Jeffrey discussed the current state of the Middle East and what the administration of US President Donald Trump is doing to resolve its regional tensions.
He criticized Trump’s plan for Gaza, calling instead for a return to Clinton’s 2000 initiative as the foundation for a two-state solution, but stressed that the war will continue until Hamas surrenders entirely.
Jeffrey, who previously served as the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the International military intervention against the Islamic State, also discussed his viewpoint on the current situation in the Middle East and what it needs to move forward.
■ The term “Middle East” is a colonial geographical construct, but has now become the dominant term to describe a region that includes Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, and others — a region historically plagued by conflict rooted in imperialist schemes. How do you perceive the current reality of the region and the impact of its history?
The “Middle East” is not a modern invention. It has been a coherent geographic, cultural, political, and religious unit since the time of the Byzantines and the Persians. Today it encompasses the Arab world, with Israel at its center, as well as Turkey and Iran.
However, various geographic, cultural, religious, and geopolitical factors prevent the region from expanding southward into sub-Saharan Africa (with the limited exception of Egypt), eastward into South Asia, or northward into Europe, Russia, and former Soviet republics, with the exception of Turkey.
■ The “Middle East” as a term gained traction through US writer Alfred Mahan in 1902 and was later revived by Condoleezza Rice under the notion of a “New Middle East” — a phrase resurfacing amid today’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon and the growing conflict with Iran. How do you view these ongoing schemes, especially with Trump’s return and the rise of far-right forces in the US?
Israel is a very close and strong ally of the US — and will remain so. Therefore, it isn’t surprising that Washington prioritizes Israel over the Palestinians. In fact, successive US administrations believe the Palestinians have missed repeated opportunities for lasting peace.
■ What role do major regional powers — particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia — play in the face of such challenges?
Since the relative decline of Sunni jihadist groups, the main geostrategic threat in the region has become the Shiite expansion and Iran’s ambition for dominance — through its potential nuclear program and interference in Arab states.
The Israeli-Palestinian issue, which transcends a bilateral dispute, resonates across the broader region and grants Iran influence as a backer of the more extreme Palestinian position — namely that of Hamas. But since October 7, 2023, Iran and its proxies — except the Huthis — have been defeated.
Turkey and Israel have emerged as the region’s most powerful states, alongside a reaffirmed US military presence.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia can leverage their relationships with these three powers (Saudi Arabia and Israel are already in unofficial dialogue) to contain Iran and advance the Israeli-Palestinian track.
From America’s perspective, this would be their most valuable contribution.
■ There seems to be no unified Arab project to counter expansionist Israeli ambitions — visible in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly beyond. This vision was articulated under Trump’s “smaller Israel that must expand” rhetoric. How can Arabs formulate a counter-project?
Israel’s expansionist rhetoric reflects the current Israeli government and ongoing trauma from October 7. It does not represent the majority of Israelis, Israel’s true interests, or America’s position — as Trump himself recently made clear to Netanyahu on camera regarding Syria.
The Arab states must continue to make it clear to both the US and Israel that such expansionist ideas are misguided and not in anyone’s best interest — not even Israel’s.
■ How can the Arab world take advantage of global power rivalries and the discourse of a multipolar world order? How can it act in its own interest rather than becoming a pawn of one dominant power — particularly one that has drained the region’s wealth for decades?
The Arab world — at least for now — is not a unified, independent actor. But through history, economic ties, cultural connections, and military relationships (among other factors), it remains closely aligned with Europe, the United States, and the Western-led international order.
While the region does engage with Russia and China, these powers do not and will not offer a real alternative to the relationship with the US.
■ If you were to envision the future of the region amid the ongoing wars and surrounding risks, what do you see unfolding?
The region must build on Arab unity while cooperating with the US, Turkey, and Israel — key players who share common security goals, including deterring Iran and defeating terrorist groups.
If this cooperation fails, the region will relapse into the chaos and violence that characterized the years between 2001-2023.
■ You previously revealed that indirect coordination was in place between the US and current Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, prior to the fall of the Assad regime. Could you elaborate on this?
[No direct response was recorded in the interview]
■ In your opinion, what pivotal events lead to the fall of Bashar al-Assad? And how could it happen in just 10 days after his regime held on for 13 years?
There were several factors that led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
The first was the “coordinated freeze” of the conflict between 2018-2020, based on actions and policies between Turkey, Israel, Arab countries, Europe, the United Nations, and driven by the US.
The second factor was the defeat of Iran and Hezbollah at the hands of Israel and the US, which led to the withdrawal of most of their forces from Syria.
And the third factor was Turkey’s support for the attack by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on Assad’s regime, leading to the collapse of his army which had protected him for 13 years, and eventually the fall of his regime.
■ In 2019, you spoke about America’s efforts to coordinate with Russia in preparation for the removal of Assad’s regime. Was Assad’s fall really part of a US deal?
The fall of Assad was not part of an American offer to Russia.
What was required from Moscow was to commit to all provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, including a new constitution and elections as part of it. However, Putin rejected the offer at the time, and the Russians appeared hesitant because they feared that accepting it could lead to the fall of their ally Assad’s regime.
This is why they delayed their response to us.
Several other factors contributed to this delay, such as Turkey’s incursion into northeastern Syria in October 2019, the spread of the coronavirus, and the US presidential election, which carried the possibility of Trump’s defeat.
All of this delayed any action up until Biden’s arrival, who then cut off talks with the Russians.
■ So, how do you see the power map in Syria under this transitional government? And what role do you expect for Russia in Syria after Assad’s defeat?
Syria is now divided amongst several powers, with Turkish, Israeli, and American forces present on Syrian territory, each supporting local forces.
However despite everything, the country can and should unify entirely behind Damascus, with foreign forces withdrawing either partially or entirely.
Regarding Russia, though it is no longer a major player in Syria it still has tools (like veto power in the U.N. Security Council and the ability to move currency and energy quickly) that are useful to it and painful for the Damascus regime.
Moscow, of course, also seeks to maintain its military bases. There is no opposition from any other power to this, so Damascus could benefit from granting Moscow access to its military bases, but under certain conditions, including non-interference in Syrian internal affairs, non-use of these bases to destabilize other countries, and no cooperation with Iran on Syria.
These should be absolute red lines for Damascus and the international community.
■ In 2021, during an interview with the “Frontline” newspaper, you explained why the US refrained from targeting al-Sharaa, saying that he did not pose a threat to US interests in Syria or elsewhere, and that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was “the lesser evil among many.” Was there any understanding or deal between Ahmad al-Shara and the United States before Assad’s fall?
Yes, there was an agreement between al-Sharaa and the US before the fall of Assad, but it was not direct.
In September 2018, the US issued exemptions to allow humanitarian aid to enter Idlib for three million internally displaced people, which benefited Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
The decisive move by Pompeo and Trump publicly in that same month, in cooperation with the Russians, stopped Assad’s attack on Idlib, leading to an official endorsement of a ceasefire in Idlib at the Istanbul summit (Turkey, Russia, France, Germany) the following month.
Later, the US government continued indirect communication with al-Sharaa to emphasize the need to avoid terrorism or opposing US counterterrorism operations in Idlib.
■ If you were asked to diagnose the roles of the US, Turkey, Arab countries, Israel, Iran, and Europeans in Syria, how would you assess each of them as a former US envoy to Syria?
The US: A potentially key player in Syria based on sanctions imposed and ground forces. However, it has not yet developed a coherent policy towards Syria, and until it does, Syria will remain at risk.
Turkey: The most active player at the moment, given Ankara’s role in overthrowing Assad, its relations with Damascus, economic and military support, ground forces, and major security concerns starting with the PKK/SDF. Turkey has played a good role so far, but the danger lies in overreaching, leading to conflict with Israel or the Syrian Democratic Forces, undermining international unity and reducing chances for a positive outcome.
Arab countries: They have surprisingly shown unified and effective support for Damascus. If they maintain these policies and offer more economic assistance, it will increase Syria’s chances of success and positively impact Israel, the United SS, and Turkey.
In short, Arab countries are crucial if they remain united and engaged.
■ In your opinion, why has the genocide in Gaza continued for over 17 months without resolution, despite Israel’s targeting of innocent civilians?
The war on Gaza will continue until Hamas surrenders or at least reliably relinquishes control of Gaza forever, or until Israel destroys Hamas, which is unlikely.
The US position supports Israel maintaining a permanent military presence in Gaza, as it does in the West Bank.
■ How would you assess the Arab, American, and Israeli positions in this war, which has claimed over 50,000 Palestinian lives?
Israel’s position is one of the three options mentioned previously. The US supports Israel absolutely, but is more flexible on issues such as temporary ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and humanitarian aid.
As for the Arab countries, they are torn between rhetorical support for the Palestinians and criticism of Israel, and the reality of needing good political and security relations with the US and Israel – all while recognizing the impossibility of bearing the cost of rebuilding Gaza if Hamas remains a factor.
No one will spend billions of dollars rebuilding Gaza just to see Hamas destroy it again.
■ Why do you believe Hamas is responsible, when all evidence from Gaza points to the Israel’s occupation forces as responsible for the genocide and the continuation of the war?
Hamas, of course, started the war and deliberately targeted Israelis.
A ceasefire could have succeeded if Hamas had signaled it was willing to negotiate terms for leaving Gaza or relinquishing power. Instead, Hamas gambled that one or more pressure factors, such as hostages, international criticism of civilian casualties, actions or threats from Iran and its proxies, or anger in the Islamic world, would force Israel to withdraw.
Hamas made the wrong bet, and therefore I believe it is responsible for the continuation of the war.
■ Don’t you think this response is a clear bias toward Israel? What do you make of far-right groups circulating AI-generated videos calling for the destruction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque to build the Third Temple?
I refuse to respond to this question.
■ A new proposal has been made for a five-year truce between Hamas and Israel. What do you think of it, and how do you expect the war to end?
The five-year truce idea is impractical. It would leave Hamas in power and focus on the October 7th incident again, so neither the US nor Israel will accept it, and no one will offer reconstruction aid.
■ Will Gaza be rebuilt, or will President Trump implement the plan he proposed earlier?
Trump’s plan for Gaza is unrealistic, but the war will continue until Hamas is destroyed, surrenders, or Israel reoccupies it.
■ No one denies that Hamas has popularity in Palestine. Given that, how do you see its political and military future? Do you think it will submit to you? Also, what about the future of the Palestinian Authority?
Hamas has no future, at least in Gaza. Its core existence is based on the destruction of Israel, and the US will not allow that. By the way, no one in the region, except Hamas and Iran’s fractured axis, wants that.
■ What is your vision for resolving the conflict, and how can peace be achieved in the Middle East?
I believe that the new leadership in Israel, as well as the Palestinians, should accept the Clinton plan from 2000, with enhanced international cooperation such as a US presence in buffer zones in the Jordan Valley and the Philadelphia Corridor, while continuing to contain Iran and terrorist groups as is currently the case.
This would bring a period of peace similar to that of South America or Western Europe.
■ Do you think some Arab countries could normalize relations with Israel without demanding a two-state solution as a basic condition for achieving genuine peace in the region?
Saudi Arabia will not implement this without some progress, at least under their current king. The UAE requested a halt to annexation before signing.
■ Some believe that Trump will seek to overthrow the Iranian regime or at least weaken it. What is your comment?
Neither. Trump and the US in general want a nuclear deal and to build on Israel/Biden’s efforts to reduce Iran’s influence in the Arab region, nothing more.
■ Why doesn’t the US adopt a similar stance on Israel’s nuclear program? What are your expectations regarding the Iranian nuclear issue?
This is a foolish question. What kind of double standard is this? Replace Israel with Pakistan. There is no real objection to Pakistan: even though it is not always stable, like Israel, it does not adopt an extremist ruling ideology or an expansionist agenda.
As for Iran, I expect it to offer a negotiated settlement because it knows that if it does not, Israel and the US will destroy its nuclear facilities.
■ Some believe that the US, Iran, Russia, and Turkey are playing roles to reap benefits at the expense of the security and stability of the region’s peoples. What is your comment on that?
Turkey and Iran are part of the region and due to their great power, they play crucial roles in it.
Regarding the US and Russia, compare the Middle East with South America, which has a larger population and economies, but where US or Russian intervention has been minimal since the Cold War.
So what’s the difference? Except for Cuba and Venezuela, South American countries enjoy internal stability and are externally committed to solving their problems independently and peacefully.
Secondly, unlike South America, the Middle East raises issues that attract external attention, such as massive dominance over global energy supplies, multiple attempts to develop nuclear and chemical weapons, terrorism, and repeated wars that the region itself cannot contain, thereby impacting the outside world and pushing regional countries to seek external help.
■ How do you diagnose the situation in Sudan, Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon? What is your vision for solving the political and security crises in these four countries?
Sudan and Libya are failed states. The best the international community can do is keep them united, provide humanitarian support, and press for de-escalation and prevent expansion. Iraq and Lebanon have a relatively different situation; Iran has destabilized them over the past 20 years, but Iran’s influence has recently diminished.
So, both countries now have a chance to return to their natural state if their people unite and work with the international community to keep Iran out, especially by avoiding the internal divisions that give Iran an opportunity to intervene.
■ Finally, you have never stopped warning about the Iranian threat, but at the same time, you have denied that Israel is the greatest threat given its practical expansions and desire to extend its influence in Arab lands. What is your comment?
You cannot judge my answers. This is my perspective which, by the way, reflects the American viewpoint I represent. This is what I have.
